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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

THOMAS SMITH,
Defendant/Appellant.

CaseNo.20010856-CA
Priority No. 2

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001), where the defendant in a district court criminal case may
take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from afinalorder for anything other than a first
degree or capital felony offense. In the underlying criminal case, Appellant Thomas
Smith was convicted of two counts of tax evasion for the year 1995. The counts were
entered as separate second and third degree felony offenses, under Utah Code Ann. § 768-1101(1) (1995). A copy of the original judgment entered in the case on September 7,
2001, is attached hereto as Addendum A (the "Original Judgment").
On September 25, 2001, standby counsel for Smith filed a notice of appeal from
the Original Judgment. This Court designated that appeal as State v. Smith. Case No.
20010817-CA ("Case No. 20010817"). Case No. 20010817 is separate from the appeal in
this matter. The appeal here is from afinalorder, dated September 26, 2001, imposing
restitution against Smith (the "September 26 Order"). A copy of the September 26 Order
is attached hereto as Addendum B.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review in this case are as follows:
1. Whether a notice of appeal, filed on September 25,2001, divested the trial
court of jurisdiction to enter an order of restitution against Smith on September 26,2001.
Standard of Review: This Court will decide an issue of jurisdiction as a matter of
law. See Security Inv. Ltd v. Brown. 2002 UT App 131,1f8,47 P.3d 97: see also State in
the Interest of B.B.. 2002 UT App 82, f*f 45 P.3d 527; State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, f39,
37 P.3d 1073 (filing of notice of appeal divested trial court of jurisdiction in the matter).
2. Whether the trial court violated Smith's due process rights by entering the
September 26 Order of restitution in Smith's absence and without a hearing.
Standard of Review: Whether a trial judge has properly sentenced a defendant in
his absence is an issue that is reviewed for correctness, without deference to the trial
court. See State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107, 1108 (Utah 1996).
3. Whether the trial court's September 26 Order of restitution violated Utah case
law and statutory law.
Standard of Review: "Generally '[w]e will not disturb a trial court's order of
restitution unless the "trial court exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its
discretion."'" State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah Ct. App.1997), cert denied.
953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997) (cite omitted). Also, the restitution statute provides a
defendant with the right to a full hearing on restitution issues. This Court will determine
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as a matter of law whether the trial court disregarded that statute. See State v.
Westerman. 945 P.2d 695,696 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (Court affords no deference to trial
court in construing application of restitution statute); see also State v. Starnes. 841 P.2d
712, 715 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (trial court misapplied the statute in denying defendant full
hearing relating to restitution order).
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
The issues on appeal in this case are preserved in the record at 898-907. In
addition, the issues here concern the legality of a post-judgment order imposing
restitution against Smith. Restitution is a sentencing issue. This Court may consider the
legality of a sentence even where the issue is raised for the first time on appeal. Utah R.
Crim. P. 22(e) (2002); State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995).
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes, rules and constitutional provisions will be determinative of
the issues on appeal:
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 22 (2002).
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 81(e) (2002).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999).
Utah Const, art. I, § 7.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV.
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached Addendum C.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings. Disposition in the Court Below.
A complete statement of the case is set forth in a separate but related appeal, Case
No. 20010817-CA. (See Brief of Appellant, Case No. 20010817, "Statement of the
Case.11)1 As set forth in Case No. 20010817, Smith was convicted by a jury of two
counts of felony tax evasion for the year 1995. (See R. 589-92.) On September 7, 2001,
the trial judge sentenced Smith to a suspended prison term for each count and ordered
him to serve 36 months probation (the "Original Judgment"). (R. 861-63.)

1 An appeal from the underlying criminal case is already pending before this Court. It is
identified as State v. Smith, Case No. 20010817-CA. Case No. 20010817 is separate
from but related to this matter. Case No. 20010817 concerns trial errors, while the appeal
in this Case No. 20010856 concerns a post-judgment restitution order.
Since the separate appeals arise from the same trial court criminal case, they share
a record on appeal. Specifically, Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides
that the record on appeal shall consist of "[a]ll of the papers" in the criminal case,
including the "original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 11(a)
and (d) (2002). Also, the rule requires "[a] single record to be transmitted" to this Court
for purposes of appeal. Id at 11(c). In that regard, the original record in this matter is
designated as Case No. 20010817.
As a convenience to the parties and Court, the clerk's office has prepared a set of
select documents from Case No. 20010817 that relates specifically to this appeal. Those
documents are contained in a folder identified as Case No. 20010856. The papers in the
folder are identified by their original page number in Case No. 20010817.
Since Case No. 20010817 and this matter share a record on appeal, standby counsel for Smith has made reference herein to the record in Case No. 20010817. In addition,
standby counsel has made reference to the Brief of Appellant on record with this Court in
Case No. 20010817. See Utah R. Evid. 201 (2002); In the Interest of S.J.. 576 P.2d
1280, 1283 (Utah 1978) (recognizing that court may take judicial notice of matters
already in the record in related proceedings); Riche v. Riche. 784 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989) (court may take judicial notice of the record and prior proceedings in the
same case).
4

Fourteen days after entry of the Original Judgment, on September 21,2001, the
state filed a "Motion to Clarify Sentencing Order." (R. 881-83.) Among other things, the
state asked the trial court to impose restitution against Smith in the amount of $6,105.94.

04)
On September 25,2001, standby counsel for Smith filed a notice of appeal from
the Original Judgment. (R. 888-89.) Thereafter, on September 26,2001, the trial court
entered an order granting the state's September 21 motion and imposing restitution
against Smith in the amount of $6,105.94. (R. 896-897.) The order was entered without
a hearing.
On September 28, Smith filed an objection to the order. (R. 898-907.) Nothing
came of that objection. Since the time for filing a notice of appeal from the September 26
Order was approaching, Smith filed a Notice of Appeal for this matter on October 22,
2001. (R. 923-24.) In this appeal, Smith maintains that the trial court erred in entering
the September 26 Order of restitution.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A complete statement of the facts is set forth in the related appeal, Case No.
20010817. (See Brief of Appellant, Case No. 20010817, "Statement of Facts"); supra
note 1, herein. In summary, on October 12,1999, the state charged Smith with two
counts of felony tax evasion for the year 1995. (R. 1-2.) Smith represented himself in
the trial court proceedings with Salt Lake Legal Defender Association serving as standby
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counsel. (See R. 193-94; 214-283; 324; 408-412.) On April 9, 2001 the trip1 court
commenced a jury trial in the case. (R. 490-91; 549-50;:. i-54.) At the conclusion of
the three-day trial, the jury found Smith guilty as charged. (R. 589-92.)
On September 7, 2001, the trial judge conducted a sentencing hearing. Smith,
standby counsel, and the state prosecutor attended the hearing and presented argument to
the trial iage as it related to sentencing in the underlying criminal matter. (R. 959.) At
the conclusion of the hearing, the j , dge entered the Original Judgment against Smith. (R.
861-63.) Thereafter, Smith filed a timely notice of appeal for Case No. 20010817. (R.
888-89). That appeal relates to the rulings of the lower court in the trial proceedings.
(See Brief of Appellant, Case No. 20010817, dated May 24, 2002.)
On September 21, the state filed a motion with the trial court, requesting, inter
alia, the imposition of restitution against Smith. The state mailed a copy of the motion to
Smith at his Vernal address and forwarded a copy to standby counsel. (R. 881-83.) On
September 26, 2001, without a hearing, the trial court granted the state's request and
entered an order imposing restitution against Smith. (R. 896-97, ^|4.)
On September 28, Smith filed a written "Objection to Proposed Order." (R. 898907.) A copy of the objection is attached hereto as Addendum D. In the objection,
Smith argued that the trial court Mlack[ed] jurisdiction to grant the relief requested" for
various reasons. (R. 898.) Smith advised the trial court that if it denied the slate's
proposed order "summarily," "no hearing" would be "needed." (R. 898.)
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Smith also made reference in the objection to a tax provision, and a "Notice of
Deficiency" that he received from the Utah State "Tax Commission regarding taxes due
for 1995." (R. 901.) Where the Notice of Deficiency alleged a specific amount in taxes
due for 1995, Smith disagreed with that amount, and noted that he had the right to
"Request a Division Conference" or to file a petition. (R. 902.) Smith argued that if the
court granted the proposed order as it related to the amount in taxes due, "such order
would negate the Notice of Deficiency in its entirety and the Defendant's right to due
process under the terms and conditions of the Notice of Deficiency." (Id.)
Smith concluded the written objection by stating the following:
Thus, as shown above the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the proposed order
and/or to proceed to or to enforce any judgment of guilty and/or to order the
Defendant to do anything and must therefore and can SUMMARILY deny the
proposed order in its entirety and no hearing is needed.
(R. 902.)
When the trial court did not respond to the objection, and the time for filing the
notice of appeal was scheduled to expire, Smithfiledthe notice of appeal for this matter.
(R. 923-24 (Notice of Appeal, dated October 22,2001).) Additional facts relating to this
appeal are set forth below.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
On September 7, 2001, the trial court in this case conducted a sentencing hearing.
During the hearing, the court entered judgment against Smith, and sentenced him to a
suspended prison term and 36 months probation. On September 21, fourteen days after
7

entry of the Original Judgment, the state filed a "Motion to Clarify Sentencing Order." In
the motion, the state requested for the first time mat the trial court impose restitution
against Smith. Thereafter, Smith filed a timely notice of appeal.
The state's "Motion to Clarify" was mislabeled. It may be more properly
characterized as a motion to alter or amend, where the state was seeking an order to
materially change the Original Judgment by imposing restitution against Smith.
According to the rules, a party must file a motion to alter or amend within 10 days
of the entry of judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e) (2002). An untimely motion to alter
or amend must be denied, Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 1982) ("When
such an untimely motion is made, the trial court's only alternative is to deny the motion"),
and will not enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b)
(2002) (if a "timely motion" to amend isfiled,the time for filing an appeal shall run from
the order granting/denying the motion).
The state's September 21 motion was untimely. Nevertheless, the trial court
granted the motion on Sentember 26, 2001, and imposed restitution against Smith in the
amount of $6,105.94. (R. 897, ^4.) The trial court entered the order of restitution
after Smith filed the notice of appeal.
The trial court erred in entering the September 26 Order in several respects: First,
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order after Smith filed a timely notice of
appeal. The notice of appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction in the matter. The
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September 26 Order should be vacated as null and void.
Second, the trial court entered the September 26 Order in Smith's absence. That
was error. A criminal defendant's right to be present at all stages of trial includes the
right to be present at sentencing. See Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1109-11. Restitution is part
of sentencing. State v. Lipskv. 608 P.2d 1241,1244 (Utah 1980) ("A court may sentence
a defendant... to pay restitution"). The restitution sentence imposed here was illegal. It
must be vacated pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Finally, the September 26 Order of restitution was entered in violation of Utah
statutory law, case law, and due process law. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(4)(e) (1999), when Smith objected to the matter, the trial court was required to give
him an evidentiary hearing on restitution. In addition, the trial court was required to
consider specific factors set forth at § 76-3-20l(8)(c) before ordering restitution. In this
case, the trial court failed to provide an evidentiary hearing. It also failed to consider the
factors as required by § 76-3-20 l(8)(c). Thus, the September 26 Order was unlawful. It
must be vacated. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201; Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e).
ARGUMENTS
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ENTER
THE SEPTEMBER 26 ORDER.
A. THIS COURT MAY REACH THE ISSUES ON APPEAL IN THIS CASE
UNDER RULE 22(e). UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
Pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a criminal defendant
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may ask this Court for the first time on appeal to correct an illegal sentence or a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2002); Brooks. 908 P.2d at 859
(finding that Rule 22(e) permits an appellate court to consider the legality of a sentence
even if the issue is raised for the first time on appeal).
Restitution is part of sentencing. Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1244 ("A court may
sentence a defendant... to pay restitution"). If a trial court imposes restitution in
violation of the Utah rules, Utah statutory law, Utah case law, or federal constitutional
law, this Court may vacate that part of sentencing

illegal, even if the issue is raised for

the first time on appeal.
In this case restitution was imposed in an illegal manner. Smith may obtain relief
from that part of sentencing for the first time on appeal pursuant to Rule 22(e).
B. A TIMELY NOTICE OF APPEAL DIVESTED THE TRIAL COURT OF
JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE STATE'S UNTIMELY MOTION. THE
TRIAL COURT'S SEPTEMBER 26 ORDER OF RESTITUTION MUST BE
VACATED.
1. The Rules That Govern the Filing of a Notice of Appeal Contain Specific Time
Limitations.
Pursuant to Rule 3(a), Utah R. App. P., a party may take an appeal from a final
order or judgment in the district court. Utah R. App. P. 3(a) (2002). Under Rule 4, the
party taking the appeal must file a notice of appeal "within 30 days after the date of entry
of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 4(a) (2002).
The 30-day time limit for filing an appeal is jurisdictional. See State v. Montoya.
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825 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). It may be tolled under Rule 4(b) with the
"timely" filing by "any party" of one of the following motions: A motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b), to be filed not later than 10 days after
entry ofjudgment); a motion to alter or amend the judgment orfindings(Utah R. Civ. P.
52(b) and 59, to befiled/served"not later than 10 days after entry of judgment"); or a
motion for a new trial (Utah R. Civ. P. 59, to be served "not later than 10 days after entry
of the judgment"; Utah R. Crim. P. 24, to be made within 10 days after sentencing).
In the event a party files a timely motion under one of the rules identified above,
the time for filing a notice of appeal will begin to runfromthe entry of the order granting
or denying that motion. Utah R. App. P. 4(b) (2002). An untimely motion for a new trial
or to amend the judgment will not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. See
Bonneville Billing & Collection v. Torres. 2000 UT App 338, ^[3, 15 P.3d 112.
2. Once a Party Files a Notice of Appeal the Trial Court Is Divested of
Jurisdiction and May Not Make Material Changes to the Judgment. That Is, the
Trial Court Is Limited to Correcting Clerical Errors and Enforcing Existing
Orders/Judgments.
Once a timely notice of appeal isfiled,the trial court's powers in the matter are
limited. The trial court may retain jurisdiction over the case as provided by the rules. See
Utah R. Civil P. 60(b) (2002) (allowing trial court to consider a motion for relief filed 3
months after entry ofjudgment); Utah R. App. P. 8 (2002) (providing that trial court must
consider motion to stay as it relates to an appeal); White v. State. 795 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah
1990). It may correct clerical errors to ensure that the written judgment will correspond
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to the order of the court. See Frost v. District Court, 83 P.2d 737, 740 (Utah 1938);
Garrison v. Davis, 54 P.2d 439,443 (U h 1936); State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388 (Utah
1988) (recognizing that trial court may correct clerical error after judgment is entered);
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) (2002); Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a) (clerical errors may be corrected at
any time).2 And it may continue to enforce its original judgments. See Cheves v.
Williams, 1999 UT 86,ffll45-48, 993 P.2d 191 (trial court has continuing jurisdiction to
enforce its judgments); State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that trial court retains jurisdiction over a probationer for the "limited purpose of
enforcing" the original judgment/order), cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994).
Indeed, once the notice of appeal is filed, the trial court is divested ofjurisdiction
over the matter; jurisdiction transfers to the appellate court. See State v. Bisner, 2001 UT
99, f39, 37 P.3d 1073 (finding that defendant's notice of appeal filed before the trial court
ruled on a pending motion divested the trial court of jurisdiction over the matter) (citing
Hi-Countrv Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305, 306 (Utah
1996) (holding that filing notice of appeal "divests the trial court of jurisdiction and
transfers it to the appellate court")); see also State v. Allen, 239 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Neb.
2 A clerical mistake exists if the judge pronounces judgment, and the recorded document
fails to accurately reflect the judge's pronouncements. See Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d
401, 402 (Utah 1984) (ruling that a mistake made in rendering the judgment is not
clerical, while a mistake made in recording the judgment is clerical); Meagher v. Equity
Oil Co, 299 P.2d 827, 830 (Utah 1956) (if order prepared by counsel does not properly
reflect judge's ruling, trial court may correct the error as a clerical mistake); Lorrah, 761
P.2d at 1389-90. In this case, the state was not seeking to have a "clerical" mistake
corrected in the judgment.
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1976) (finding any order entered by the district court "subsequent to the vesting of the
jurisdiction" in the appellate court is void because the appellate court and the district
court "should not exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the same case"). Thus, after the
notice is filed, the trial court may not take any action that would change or modify the
judgment in any substantive or material respect, since that court lacks jurisdiction to take
such action. See Bisner. 2001 UT 99, ^[39; Allen. 239 N.W.2d at 274.
3. Where the Trial Court Did Not Impose Restitution Against Smith in the
Original Judgment the Entry of an Order to that Effect on September 26
Constituted a Material Change to the Judgment. The Trial Court Lacked
Jurisdiction to Enter the September 26 Order After Smith Filed the Timely Notice
of Appeal.
Under Utah law, the imposition of restitution against a defendant is material and
substantial, where a restitution order is the equivalent of a legal or civil judgment and is
enforceable under the rules of civil procedure. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(iv)
(1999), see State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 653-54 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). A restitution
order survives death, State v. Christensen, 866 P.2d 533, 536-37 (Utah 1993), and may
not be dischargeable in bankruptcy. State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611,612 (Utah 1985).
According to Utah statutory law and case law, when restitution is imposed against
a defendant, he may be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the matter. Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-20 l(4)(e) (1999). The evidentiary hearing ensures due process, where the
defendant may present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and he may examine and
challenge the accuracy and reliability of the factual information upon which the
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restitution award is based. See State v. Gomez. 887 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1994)
(recognizing due process at sentencing hearings); Starnes, 841 P.2d at 715.
fa) The trial court did not impose restitution against Smith in the Original
Judgment
In this case, the trial court did not order restitution in connection with the Original
Judgment. Indeed, the trial court sentenced Smith to a suspended prison term, and
ordered him to serve 36 months probation. The court ordered Smith to pay a fine and surcharge totaling $5,108; to cooperate with the Utah State Tax Commission in completing
tax returns; and to serve 500 hours of community service. The trial court imposed those
particular conditions against Smith in the Original Judgment as part of probation. The
trial court entered the Original Judgment on September 7. .001. (R. 861-63.)
(b) The state requested the imposition of restitution for the first time in the postjudgment September 21 motion.
On September 21, approximately two weeks after the trial court entered the
Original Judgment, the state filed and served a post-judgment motion entitled, "Motion to
Clarify Sentencing Order." In the motion, the state asked the trial court for the first time
to impose restitution against Smith as part of sentencing. The motion stated the
following:
Comes Now, the State of Utah, by and through Mark W. Baer, Assistant Attorney
General and hereby request [sic] that the Court in the above cited case clarify the
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment Order entered in the above cited case. In
support thereof, the State notes as follows:
*

*

*

3. [sic] No restitution amount appears in the Judgment/Sentence in this case.
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2. [sic] However; as part of the sentencing request, the State had asked for a
criminal restitution order in the minimum amount of $6,105.94, which amount
represents the amount that the defendant owed as of the investigation of his case in
August, 1999. The State renews that request at this time and ask[s] that it be
memorialized as part of the record in this case.
(R. 881-882; see also id. at ^[6(4U
Contrary to the prosecutor's representations in the September 21 motion, the state
did not raise the issue of restitution during the original sentencing proceedings, the state
did not ask for restitution in any amount during those proceedings, and the state did not
request that the trial court impose restitution in connection with sentencing. (R. 959.)
In fact, at sentencing the state asked the trial court to "follow the recommendations
of AP&P" (R. 959:16, 18), to impose a one-year jail sentence, to require Smith's
cooperation with the Utah State Tax Commission in filing past tax returns, to impose a
fine against Smith, and to order Smith to community service. (See R. 929:18, 24, 28.)
While the state made certain particular requests at the original sentencing, it specifically
did not request the imposition of restitution.
As for Adult Probation and Parole (ffAP&P"), that agency recommended that
Smith be remanded "to the custody of the Department of Corrections to serve a term of
incarceration at the Utah State Prison" for the second and third degree felony offenses.
(R. 750, page 7.) AP&P also stated the following regarding restitution:
RESTITUTION: No restitution appears to be owing at this time, however, if the
defendant does file an Income Tax Return for 1995, there may be an amount owed
to the State of Utah.
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(R. 750, page 2.)3 In the end, "[n]o restitution amount appear[ed] in the
Judgment/Sentence in this case" (R. 882), because none was requested at sentencing.
Given the proceedings, the state's "Motion to Clarify Sentencing Order" may be
more properly characterized as a motion to alter or amend. The state's motion requested
a material change to the conditions of probation, and a substantive addition to the
Original Judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 81(e); see also Bairv Axiom Design.
2001 UT 20, T1J9-10,20 P.3d 388 (this Court will disregard the label of a motion and
consider its content); see also Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA & Son. 808 P.2d 1061, 106465 (Ui I 1991) (same). Such a motion is governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(c) Where the state 's motion was untirr V. it did not toll the time for filing the
notice of appeal In t -at regard, the notice of appeal divested the trial court of
jurisdiction to consia the state's request for an order of restitution.
Pursuant to Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to alter or amend
the judgment "shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." Utah
R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 81(e) (2002). The language of Rule 59(e) is mandatory. If a motion
to alter/amend is filed in an untimely manner, "the trial court's only alternative is to deny
the motion." Burgers, 652 P.2d at 1321.
3 In a letter to AP&P, the prosecutor stated,
As a supplement to the earlier letter in this case, the lead investigator in this case,
Dorothy Akins, reports that the criminal investigation unit's calculation with
respect to the amount of taxes, penalty and interest owed by this defendant - for
1995 alone - was $ 7,162.64, as of April 9, 2001.
(R. 750, attached letter.) The letter shows that the state was aware of an amount in taxes
allegedly owing by the defendant. Nevertheless, the state specifically did not request
(either in the letter or otherwise) the imposition of restitution in the case. (See R. 959.)
16

The language in Burgers is sound policy. The Utah rules of procedure are
designed to provide regularity in court proceedings. Such regularity allows the trial court
and parties to rely on the finality of a judgment after it is entered. If the trial court
neglects to follow the rules by allowing a party to file an untimely motion to amend, the
process creates uncertainty and unwarranted, extended litigation in the matter. In that
regard, a post-judgment motion must be timely filed to ensure reliability in the process,
fairness to the parties, andfinalityin the judgment.
The timeliness of a post-judgment motion to amend is relevant for another reason:
It postpones the time for filing a notice of appeal. Utah R. App. P. 4(b). "The serving of
such a [timely] motion suspends from running the one-month period in which a party
usually has to file a notice of appeal." Burgers. 652 P.2d at 1321. In this case, if the state
had filed a motion to amend within 10 days of judgment, its motion would have tolled the
time for filing a notice of appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 3, 4 (2002). Smith would have
been required to wait until resolution of the state's motion before he could file an
effective notice of appeal. See U-M Invs. v. Rav. 658 P.2d 1186, 1187 (Utah 1982);
Robinson & Wells v. Warren. 669 P.2d 844, 845 (Utah 1983) (stating that the time for
filing a notice of appeal runsfromthe date of the order granting or denying the timely
motion under Rule 59); Regan v. Blount. 1999 UT App 154, f4, 978 P.2d 1051;
Anderson v. Schwendiman. 764 P.2d 999, 1000 (Utah Ct App. 1988) (filing of a timely
post-judgment motion as listed in Rule 4 suspends the finality of the judgment, and any
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notice of appeal filed prior to the entry of an order disposing of that motion is not
effective to confer jurisdiction on an appellate court).
Here, the state's untimely motion did not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal.
Thus, the appeals clock was running against Smith.
Stated another way, in this case, the state filed its September 21 motion for
restitution more than 10 days after entry of the Original Judgment. Due to the late filing,
the . late ran the risk that the trial court would be divested of jurisdiction before the
motion could be resolved; Smith was already well into e period ibr filing the notice of
appeal. The pros*. :utor apparently recognized the timing issue and immediately followed
his motion with a proposed order before Smith could even respond to the motion. (R.
881-83,896-97.)
After the state filed the untimely motion, Smith filed a timely notice of appeal. (R.
888-89.) Smith's notice divested the trial court of jurisdiction to enter a ruling in the
matter. Bisnen 2001 UT 99, ^[39. Notwithstanding the lack of jurisdiction, the trial court
granted the untimely motion and amended the Original Judgment in a material respect: it
imposed restitution as an additional condition of probation. That was improper.
The September 26 Order was improper for two reasons: First, under Burgers, 652
P.2d at 1321, the trial court's "only alternative" was to deny the state's September 21
motion as untimely. Id. The trial court erred when it failed to deny the untimely motion.
Second, under Bisnen 2001 UT 99, ^39, Smith's September 25 notice of appeal was
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properly and timely filed. It effectively divested the trial court ofjurisdiction to enter the
September 26 Order of restitution and to make a material addition to the Original
Judgment.
For those reasons, Smith requests that this Court reverse the trial court's
September 26 Order of restitution. The order is null and void, where the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to entertain the state's untimely motion after Smith filed the notice of appeal.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT UNLAWFULLY IMPOSED AN
ADDITIONAL CONDITION ON SENTENCING WITHOUT AFFORDING
SMITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ON THE MATTER.
As set forth above, in this case the state filed a post-judgment motion on
September 21, 2001, asking the court, among other things, to impose restitution against
Smith. The motion was filed 14 days after entry of the Original Judgment. On
September 26,2001, the trial court entered an order granting the state's motion. The
court entered the September 26 Order without first hearing from Smith on the matter.
That was improper.
According to Utah law, restitution may be imposed as part of sentencing. Lipskv.
608 P.2d at 1244 (as part of sentencing, a court may order the defendant to pay
restitution); see supra, Point I.A., herein. Before a trial court may impose a sentence on a
defendant, the court "shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to
present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why
sentence should not be imposed.1' Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). The plain and mandatory
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language of Rule 22(a) places an obligation on the trial covt to afford the defendant the
opportunity to speak at sentencing and to present informal.

* elevant to

atencing

considerations.
In addition, the due process clause of both the state a

federal constitutions

entitles a defendant to be present at sentencing. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Utah
Const, art. I, § 7. Due process "requires that a sentencing judge act i reasonably
reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence." State v.
Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064 1071 (Utah 1993) (cites omitted); State v. Howell. 707 P.2d 115,
118 (Utah 1985) (Art. 1, § 7 of Utah Constitution requires sentencing judge to act on
reliable, relevant information in exercising discretion in sentencing); Lipskv. 608 P.2d at
1248-49; Gomez. 887 P.2d at 854-55. That means, the defendant must be given the
opportunity to be heard.
Also, the right to be present at sentencing is supported by sound policy
considerations. See United States v. Turner. 532 F. Supp. 913, 915 (D.C. Cal. 1982);
State v. Fettis. 664 P.2d 208, 209 (Ariz. 1983). "[T]he common law has traditionally
required that the defendant be present at his sentencing." Turner, 532 F.Supp. at 915; see
also United States v. Lastra. 973 F.2d 952, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citation omitted) ("The
requirement that the defendant be present when sentence is passed has deep common law
origins1"). Presence is of critical importance to sentencing not only because it allows a
adge to be presented with

information needed for a full sentencing hearing, but it also
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allows the judge to question the defendant about pertinent matters. "It is only when the
defendant is before the court that a reasonable and rational sentencing can take place."
Fettis. 664 P.2d at 209. The Utah rules and due process requirements work together to
ensure fairness at sentencing.
In this case, the trial court entered the September 26 Order without allowing Smith
the opportunity to speak to the issue of restitution. That was unfair. The order violated
Smith's constitutional and statutory rights. See also Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a); Johnson. 856
P.2d at 1071: Howell. 707 P.2d at 118; Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7) (1999) ("At the time
of sentencing, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information the
defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate
sentence").
To be clear, the trial court in this case allowed Smith to be heard at the original
sentencing hearing on issues that were raised and addressed in connection with entry of
the Original Judgment. (See R. 959; 861-63.) That was appropriate. Since the state did
not raise the issue of restitution and the trial court did not impose restitution as part of
sentencing, there was no reason for Smith to address the matter at the original hearing.
(See R. 959.)
Thereafter, the trial court imposed restitution in the September 26 Order without
giving Smith an opportunity to make a statement, present information in mitigation of
such an order, or object to the proceedings. In fact, the trial court entered the order just 5
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days after the state filed the untimely motion seeking imposition of restitution. (R. 88183; 896-97.) Smith was not given sufficient opportunity even to make a meaningful
objection to the motion before the order was entered. See i.e., Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4501(1)(B) (rules governing civil practice provide a party opposing a motion with 10 days
to respond); 4-504 (rules governing civil practice require a party submitting a proposed
order to the court to first serve the proposed order on the opposing party, before being
submitted to the court; the opposing party has five days to object to the proposed order).
In this case the trial court imposed a restitution sentence without giving Smith an
opportunity to be heard on the matter. That was unlawful. Pursuant to Rule 22(e) (see
supra. Point I.A., herein), Smith respectfully requests that this Court vacate the restitution
provision of the September 26 Order.4
4 This Court may vacate the September 26 Order without resorting to Rule 22(e). That is,
Smith filed an "Objection to [the state's] Proposed Order." (R. 898-907.) The Objection
adequately served to preserve the allocution issue for appeal.
In the objection, Smith argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the
state's motion in various respects, and it should summarily deny the state's request
without a hearing. (R. 898.) Indeed, as set forth above (see supra. Point L3., herein), the
trial court should have summarily denied the state's request for restitution without any
further hearing on the matter. Since the trial court did not summarily deny the request,
Smith was entitled to a hearing.
Also, in the "Objection to Proposed Order," Smith made reference to a "Notice of
Deficiency" that he received "from the Tax Commission regarding taxes due for 1995."
(R. 901-02.) Smith disagreed with the amount in taxes claimed by the state and he noted
his right to a "Division Conference" in connection with the matter. (R. 902.) Where the
amount in alleged taxes set forth in the "Notice of Deficiency" related directly to the
restitution requested by the prosecutor in the September 21 motion, Smith's reference to
a "Division Conference" in the objection should have alerted the trial court to the fact
that Smith disputed the amount in taxes claimed by the state, and he was entitled to a
hearing.
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROVIDE
SMITH WITH A HEARING ON RESTITUTION UNDER UTAH
STATUTORY LAW.
A. PURSUANT TO SECTION 76-3-20 U4¥e\ SMITH WAS ENTITLED TO
AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) provides the following: "If the defendant objects
to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the time of
sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(4)(e) (1999) (emphasis added). The "full hearing" provision ensures due process.
See Stames, 841 P.2d at 715 (recognizing that "full hearing" provision entitles defendant
to present evidence and cross-examine the other side's witnesses).
In this case, Smith filed an objection to the post-judgment order. (See Addendum
D, hereto.) That was all he was required to do under the law to be afforded a full
restitution hearing. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(e). The trial court failed to provide
Smith with such a hearing. That was improper. Id,
In considering what constitutes a "full hearing," this Court's decision in State v.
Starnes, 841 P.2d 712, is instructive. There, defendant pleaded guilty to charges of criminal mischief and assault, and the victim requested restitution. Thereafter, a restitution
hearing was scheduled, which the defendant failed to attend for lack of notice. Id. at 713.
The trial judge ordered restitution against defendant in the amount of $281.89. Id.
When Defendant Starnes failed to make restitution payments on the judgment, the
trial judge entered an order to show cause against him and held a hearing. During that
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proceeding, defendant asked the court to set aside the judgment and to provide a full
hearing on the restitution award. Id. In response to defendant's request, the trial court
held two additional hearings (a hearing was held on November 13, 1991 and a hearing
was held on January 8, 1992), where defendant was able to engage in a limited and
flustered cross-examination of the victim with respect to the alleged damages suffered,
and to proffer evidence from his own witnesses. Stames. 841 P.2d at 713-14. The judge
specifically refused to permit defendant's witnesses to testify. Id at 714.
After the hearings, the judge increased the amount in restitution to $450.
Defendant appealed and argued "the trial court denied him his statutory right to a full
hearing." Id. at 714. On appeal, this Court addressed the matter of the full hearing and
found that the trial court violated the statute. Specifically, this Court determined that to
constitute a full hearing, not only was the trial court required to provide defendant with
the opportunity to review and cross-examine the evidence supporting the amount in
damages, but also, it was required to allow the defendant to present his evidence at the
hearing. Id at 715. This Court stated, "Even when the third and fourth hearings are
combined, however, it is evident that Stames was not afforded a 'full hearing.5 The trial
court refused to 'hear' Stames's evidence that there was no actual damage. Therefore,
while Stames was allowed to appear in court, he was denied an opportunity to present his
evidence." Id at 715. This Court remanded the case for a proper hearing. Id. at 716.
In this case, Smith objected to the proposed post-judgment order on the basis that
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the trial court lacked authority to enter it. (R. 898 ("Objection to Proposed Order").)
Smith informed the trial court that if it denied the state's proposed order "summarily," "no
hearing" would be needed. (R. 898.) Smith also identified a "Notice of Deficiency"
from the state tax commission reflecting amounts due in taxes for 1995. (R. 901.) Smith
disagreed with the amounts and advised the trial court that he had the right to a "Division
Conference" or a petition on the matter. (R. 902.) Smith's filing constituted an objection
to restitution.
Pursuant to the mandatory language of Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e), Smith was required
only to object to the proposed order. Thereafter, the trial court was obligated to provide a
full hearing on the issue of restitution. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(e).5 In this case,
Smith placed the trial court on sufficient notice of his objection and his right to a hearing.
(R. 902.) The trial court erred in failing to provide an evidentiary hearing on the
restitution issues. Smith respectfully requests that this Court remand the case for a full
evidentiary hearing in accordance with Section 76-3-20l(4)(e).

5 In the event this Courtfindsthat Smith's objection was insufficient to constitute a
request for a hearing pursuant to Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e), this Court nevertheless should
vacate the restitution order, where the trial court failed to provide Smith with an
opportunity to be heard on the matter before it entered the order. See supra. Point II.
That is, the trial court entered the order in this case only five days after the state filed the
untimely motion. The hasty manner in which the court granted the state's restitution
request prevented Smithfromfilinga meaningful objection to the issues. On that basis,
this Court may vacate the September 26 Order. See American Vending Servs.. Inc. v.
Morse. 881 P.2d 917, 925-26 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (finding that trial court erred in
entering an order before both parties could be properly heard on the matter).
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B. IN ORDERING RESTITUTION, THE JUDGE FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
MANDATORY FACTORS SET FORTH AT S 76-3-20 U8¥eV
In ordering restitution, the trial judge failed in this matter to take into consideration
the mandatory factors set forth in Section 76-3-20l(8)(c). Section 76-3-20 l(8)(c)
provides the following:
In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8)(b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of
restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other
conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the
method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(8)(c) (1999). The statute also requires the trial court to make
a record of its reasons for ordering restitution. Id. at -201(4)(d)(i).
Utah case law supports that the trial court must make a record of its consideration
of the specific factors set forth at § 76-3-20 l(8)(c). "We read this requirement [at section
76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i)] to mean that after taking into account the factors listed in section 76-3201(4)(c) [now subsection (8)(c)], the trial court must take the additional step of explicitly
noting on the record the reasons for the decision it reached, reflecting the detailed factors
listed in the statute." State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1234 (Utah 1997). Also, "in
determining whether or not to order restitution, the [trial] court is required to consider the
financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will
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impose, the ability of the defendant to pay restitution, the rehabilitative effect of the
payment of restitution, and other relevant circumstances." Department of Employment
Sec, of Indus. Com'n of Utah v. Ninth Circuit Court in and for Cedar Citv Dept.. 718
P.2d 782, 784 (Utah 1986): see also Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1028 (Utah 1996)
(in ordering restitution, the Board is required not only to consider statutory factors, but
also to make a record of the reasons for ordering restitution); Miller v. State. 932 P.2d
618, 621 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (Board is required to consider factors in ordering
restitution); Stames, 841 P.2d at 715 n.3 (court must consider defendant's financial
resources in determining restitution); State v. Haston. 811 P.2d 929, 936-37 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) (the trial court "must declare reasons within the statutoryframeworkfor
awarding or denying restitution"), revfd on other grounds, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993).
In this case, the record is silent with respect to the mandatory statutory factors set
forth at § 76-3-20 l(8)(c) and the reasons for the court's order of restitution. There is no
indication that in ordering restitution the trial judge considered Smith's financial
resources, the burden that payment of restitution would impose on Smith with regard to
other obligations, and Smith's ability to pay restitution. (R. 896-97, ^|4.)6

6 According to the record here, the Honorable Raymond Uno presided over the
September 7 sentencing hearing and entered the Original Judgment in the case. (R. 959.)
Thereafter, the Honorable Michael Burton signed the September 26 Order of restitution.
(R. 896-97.) There is no indication in the record that Judge Burton reviewed any
information regarding Smith before signing the September 26 Order, or that he made any
assessment of the statutory factors as required by law before imposing restitution against
Smith.
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In: much as the trial court failed to make a record of the reasons for ordering
restitutio! vithin the statutoryframeworu of Section 76-3-201 (8)(c), (see Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i); Starnes. 841 P.2d at 715 n.3), the September 26 Order of
restitution is unlawful.
Indeed, consideration of the factors set forth at Section 76-3-20 l(8)(c) supports
that restitution was inappropriate. Smith was financially destitute. At the time of
sentencing, he was unemployed. (R. 750, Presentence Report, 5.) Smith had debts but no
monthly income, and he was bankrupt in 1998. (Id. at 5.) Also, during sentencing in this
case, Smith was ordered to serve 500 hours of community service and to pay more than
$5,000 in fines and surcharges. The financial obligations and community service
certainly would have an effect on Smith's ability to pay restitution.
If the trial court had considered the factors under Section 76-3-20 l(8)(c), it likely
would not have ordered restitution in the amount of $6,105.94 as requested by the state.
Under the relevant factors, Smith did not have the financial resources or the ability to pay
restitution. Also, restitution would impose a burden on Smith's ability to perform
community service, provide for his family, and pay the fines and surcharges. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(8)(c). The trial court erred in ordering restitution in this case.7
7 This Court may reach the issues raised in this Point III under Rule 22(e), where
restitution was imposed in an illegal manner. The trial judge here failed to comply with §
76-3-20l(8)(c) and (4)(d)(i), and to consider the mandatory statutory factors before
ordering restitution against Smith. See supra. Point I.A., herein.
In the alternative, the trial court committed plain error when it failed to consider
the statutory factors set forth in Section 76-3-201(8)(c), and when it failed to make a
28

Smith respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order of restitution, or in the
alternative remand the matter in order that Smith may be permitted a full hearing,
including proper consideration of the factors set forth at Section 76-3-20 l(8)(c).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(3) (1990) [now § 76-3-201(4)], expressly requires the
trial court to make its reasons for granting restitution a part of the record. The
statute further requires that the trial court consider the defendant's financial
resources and the rehabilitative effect of the restitution when determining whether
to award restitution. Corresponding findings should therefore be made on remand.
State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 936 (Utah App. 1991) (findings should follow the
statutory framework).
Starnes, 841 P.2d at 715 n. 3.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Smith respectfully requests that this Court enter an
order vacating the trial court's September 26 Order of restitution.

record of its reasons for ordering restitution. To establish plain error, appellant must
show, "(0 An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and
(iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict
is undermined." State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
An obvious error exists when the trial court fails to comply with the mandatory
language of a statute. State v. Labrum. 925 P.2d 937, 940-41 (Utah 1996). Also, where
prior case law has specifically required the trial court to consider the factors at subsection
(8)(c), the trial court's failure to comply with the law constitutes plain error. See Dept.
Empl. Sec, of Indus. Corn's of Utah. 718 P.2d at 784; Miller. 932 P.2d at 621;
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234. There is no indication here that the trial court complied
with subsections (8)(c) and (4)(d)(i) in ordering restitution. (R. 896-97; see also supra.
note 6, herein.) Thus, error exists. Because Utah statutory and case law requires the court
to make a record and to consider the factors in determining restitution, the error is
obvious. Finally, there is a reasonable likelihood that Smith would not have been ordered
to pay the full amount in restitution if the court had considered the statutory factors.
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ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 991920225 FS

THOMAS HOWARD SMITH,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

RAYMOND S. UNO
September 7, 2001

PRESENT
Clerk:
marcyt
Prosecutor: MARK W BAER
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): RONALD S FUJINO
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 16, 1943
Video
Tape Number:
1:08
CHARGES
1. TAX EVASION - 3rd
Plea: Guilty 2. TAX EVASION - 2nd
Plea: Guilty -

Degree Felony
Disposition: 04/11/2001 {Guilty Plea}
Degree Felony
Disposition: 04/11/2001 {Guilty Plea}

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of TAX EVASION a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of TAX EVASION a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.

Darro 1

Case No: 991920225
Date:
Sep 07, 2001

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT / CONS EJTTIVE NOTE
Counts are to run concurrent.

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fj.ne:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$1000.00
$0.00
$459.46
$1000.00

Charge # 2

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$2500.00
$0.00
$1148.65
$2500.00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$3500.00
$0
$1608.11
$3500.00
Plus Interest

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 3500.00 which includes the surcharge.
Interest may increase the final amount due.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to cooperate with the Tax Commission and file returns
for all years requested.
Defendant is to make any future tax filings.
Defendant is to complete 500 hours community service doing service
approved by APPD.
Defendant is to pay a fine of $3500 which includes the surcharge.
Paae 2

Case No: 991920225
Date:
Sep 07, 2001
A review hearing is set for March 15, 2002 at 8:30 a.m.
Defendant is to keep the State informed of his address at all
times.
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 03/15/2002
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Third Floor - W37
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SLC, UT 84111-1860
Before Judge: MICHAEL K. BURTON
Dated this

day of

/

\x

RAYMO:
District
In compliance with the Americans with Disabili^J^^^^yW^J6ividuals
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary1 ^uTflmunicative
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third
District Court-Salt Lake at 238-7058 at least three working days
prior to the proceeding. The general information phone number is
(801)238-7300.

Darra
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ADDENDUM B

FILED DISTRICT GOUft'f
Third Judicial District
By: MARK W. BAER #5440
Assistant Attorney General
MARK SHURTLEFF #4666
Attorney General
Attorney For The State of Utah
Heber Wells Building
PMB 140814
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801)366-0199

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

v.

Criminal No. 011002002-TS

THOMAS H. SMITH
DOB: 01/16/43
Defendant.

|

ORDER
The defendant is hereby Ordered as follows in addition to anything already
ordered in this case:
(1) File all past Utah State returns from 1990 to present;
(2) That the filings must account for income and expenses of the defendant;
(3) That the defendant must present supporting documentation with such returns;

5

(4) That Restitution is hereby set at $6,105.94, for purposes of this criminal case only,
but that this amount does not bind the Utah State Tax Commission, and further only related
to tax year 1995.
DONE IN COURT this

^

day of

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed s true and exact copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid,
to the following:
Ron Fujino
Salt Lake Legal Defender Asoociation
Stand-By Counsel for Defendant
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Thomas H. Smith
1301 WHBR
Vernal, Utah 84078
MarkW. Baer
Assistant Attorney General
Heber Wells Building
PMB 140814
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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ADDENDUM C

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed.
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any
information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be
issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with
the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time.
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court
shall so specify in the sentencing order.
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.)

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented
from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any
question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by
chanc or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit
of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making tl application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under
the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or
that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than
10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made
under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit.
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period
not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties
by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general.
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rules shall apply to all special
statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly
inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any part
of the former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance
with these rules.
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall not apply to proceedings in
uncontested probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all proceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement of
any judgment or order entered.
(c) Application to small claims. These rules shall not apply to small
proceedings except as expressly incorporated in the Small Claims Rules.
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of an administrative board
or agency. These rules shall apply to the practice and procedure in appealing
from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other action of an
administrative board or agency, except insofar as the specific statutory
procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is in conflict or
inconsistent with these rules.
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall also
govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable
statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any
statutory or constitutional requirement.
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.)

76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution
— Hearing.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction'' includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings
and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in
Subsection (4)(c).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities.
<
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's
criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law
to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil ppnalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.

(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted ofcriminal activity that has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as
defined in Subsection (l)(e).
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections
(4)(c) and (4)(d).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in
Subsection (8)(b) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of
the order to the parties.
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover
reasonable attorney's fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a hen when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77,
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended
by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete
restitution and court-ordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be
determined as provided in Subsection (8).

(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for
the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment,
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make mles permitting the
restitution payments to be credited to principal tirst and the remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance wi i Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the
defendant a full hearing on the issue.
5) (a) In addition
any other sentence the court may impose, the court
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal
charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported;
and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants
actually transported in a single trip.
,6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumst rices in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to r at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in

the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing,
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child,
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over
any conflicting provision of law.
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care,
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense
resulted in the death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for courtordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8)(b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT XIV

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection-]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of l i e United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec, 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way ^ridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec, 3. [Disqualification to hold office-]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, o r a s a n officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereoi. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but ail such del .s, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

ADDENDUM D

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
Thomas Smith
1301 WHBR
Vernal, Utah 84078
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 991920225
Plaintiff,
Objection to Proposed Order

v.
Thomas Smith,
Defendant.

Defendant, Thomas Smith, hereby responds, objects to and moves the Court to
summarily deny the Plaintiffs proposed order on grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction to
grant the relief requested (no hearing is needed) and sets forth his reasons below.
FACTS
1.

Defendant was charged with one count of tax evasion a third degree felony for the year
1995.

2.

Defendant was charged with one count of tax evasion a second degree felony for the
year 1995.

3.

Defendant was not charged with any tax crime whatsoever for any year other than 1995.

4.

Defendant's conviction was only for the year 1995 and for no other year.
Objection to order
Case No 991920225
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5.

No evidence or testimony was presented at trial regarding any filing requirement for any
year other than 1995, nor was the jury asked to determine a filing requirement for any
year other than 1995.

6.

Therefore, there was no determination regarding any filing requirement for any year
other than 1995.

7.

Plaintiff seeks an summary order requiring Defendant to file tax returns for years other
than the year 1995.
DISCUSSION
The only year at issue in the instant matter is 1995. Plaintiff had more than ample

opportunity to bring forth charges that Defendant had a filing requirement for years other than
1995 and to set forth the facts on which Plaintiff believed that Defendant was required to file.
Plaintiff did not bring forth such charges, nor did Plaintiff set forth such facts at trial.
Therefore, Plaintiff is estopped from bringing forth such request as a summary proceeding and
the Court is estopped from granting such request. Further, because such facts are not before
the Court, the Court lacks subject matter and in personum jurisdiction over such matters.
By making the request that the Court order Defendant to file such returns for years other
than 1995, Plaintiff is asking the Court to relieve Plaintiff of its requirement to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Defendant is required to file for a year other than 1995. The Court lacks
jurisdiction to make such an order in the absence of a determination by a trier of fact that such

Objection to order
Case No 991920225
page 2 of 11 pages

returns are required.
The most important issues established in the instant matter are that whether or not the
Defendant is required to file a tax return and pay a tax is an issue of fact not an issue of law.
To determine issues of fact requires a trial at which plaintiff sets forth the evidence and
testimony and a trier of fact makes a determination on the basis of the facts set forth, and that
failure to file a tax return and pay a tax is not a civil matter, but, is a criminal matter which
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Plaintiff, by not bringing a charge of failing

to file and pay for years other than 1995 has forfeited its right to require Defendant to file and
pay for years other than 1995.
Not withstanding such requirement, Plaintiff seeks to circumvent Defendant's right to
due process and to have a trier of fact make a determination that Defendant is required to file
for years other than 1995, by asking the Court to summarily order the Defendant to file tax
returns for years other than that which the Defendant stands convected of. If the Court has
jurisdiction to summarily order the Defendant to file for years other than 1995, then the Court
had jurisdiction to summarily order the Defendant to file for 1995 and no trial would have been
necessary. The Court has no such authority.
Years ago the State of Utah issued a Writ of Mandate to individuals that the Tax
Commission felt should file tax returns (a civil summary proceeding requiring a lower civil
evidentiary requirement). In this process the court would summarily order the individual to file

Objection to order
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and jail him/her for contempt if such return was not filed. This procedure was found to be
defective, in that it constituted a denial of the individuals right to due process, because as
established by the instant matter failure to file is a criminal matter. It cannot be determined on
the basis of a civil proceeding and the lower civil evidentiary requirement. Nor, can it be
determined on the basis of a summary proceeding in the absence of a trial. The dett nination
of the requirement to file is highly fact sensitive. Since the requirement to file is criminal
proceeding, it requires a criminal adjudication and a criminal evidentiary requirement. As
stated above the Defendant is not charged with nor has the Defendant been found beyond a
reasonable doubt, by a trier of fact, to be required to file for any year other than 1995. In the
absence of such a finding beyond a reasonable doubt by a trier of fact, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to summarily order the Defendant to file returns for any year other than 1995.
Therefore, numbers 1,2,3, must be denied for lack jurisdiction.
Utah Code Annotated 59-7-517(2) requires that before any proceeding against a
taxpayer is commenced the taxpayer must be noticed. The Court should take judicial notice
that prior to trial no notice of a tax due was sent to Defendant, nor was any exhibit or testimony
presented to the jury that a notice was sent. The attached Notice of Deficiency, dated
September 20,2001, is the first notice the Defendant has received from the Tax Commission
regarding taxes due for 1995. Thus the instant case was commenced in violation of Title 59-7517(2) and the Court lacks jurisdiction to proceed or to enforce any judgment of guilty and/or
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to order the Defendant to do anything. Pursuant to the attached Notice of Deficiency the Court
lacks jurisdiction to order the Defendant to file for the year 1995 because such order would
circumvent the Defendants due process rights to appeal the deficiency as noted on the
attached Notice of Deficiency accordingly.
As to item number 4, the aforesaid Notice of Deficiency alleges a deficiency of
$8,004.39 for the year 1995. The Court will note that said Deficiency notices the Defendant
that he has the right to 1) Request a Division Conference or 2) to file a Petition for
Redetermination within 30 days of the mailing date of this letter. If the Court were to grant the
proposed order as to item number 4 such order would circumvent and deny Defendant his
appealrightsas granted by instruction number 2 on the Deficiency Notice. Further, such order
would negate the Notice of Deficiency in its entirety and the Defendant's right to due process
under the terms and conditions of the Notice of Deficiency. Additionally, the issuance of the
attached Notice of Deficiency takes jurisdiction to determine the amount of tax due away from
this Court and places it squarely within the jurisdiction of State Tax Commission appeals
division.
Thus, as shown above the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the proposed order and/or
to proceed or to enforce any judgment of guilty and/or to order the Defendant to do anything
and must therefore and can SUMMARILY deny the proposed order in its entirety and no
hearing is needed.
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Dated September 26,2001
Is! Thomas Smith
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing by fax on the following:
Third District Court; Mark W. Bear Assistant Attorney General, 160 E. 300 S. 6th Floor, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114; Ron Fujino, 424 IE. 500 S. Ste 300, Salt Lake City, UT, 84111.
Dated: September 26, 2001

Is! Thomas Smith
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STV5T ?

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
NOTICE OF AUDIT CHANGE CONTINUED

DO JSfO? MAIL THIS BLANK COUPON.
KAIL IX THE COUPON CONTAIN IKG
PREPRINTED ACCOUNT, FILING PERIOD
AND AKOUNT ON REVERSE S I D E .

S£?TD6£R 3 0 , 200!
STATUTORY NOTICE 0* ESTIMATED 1MC0ME TAX
PAYMENT WE GATE: OCTOBER 22, 2001
TAX T*PE: INCCML
SOCIAL SECURITY Ntfr8Eft: S 2 3 - W - W 3
TAX YEAR: 1995

THOMAS & MARIA SMITH
1301 UHBR
VERML l/T 84078

fCN; 36*391448026

I f you wtsfc to m e ^ r e about this return please do SC within 30 days c f We date of t h i s TOtice, or you aay f i l e a correct
return. Pteas* note that a prorcpt response is needed in order t o protect your appeal n g n t s . These appeal rignts art
outlined on the £>adc of t*iis notice.
Additional penalties and interest w i n be assessed i f payment is not received by the "payment due" date shown aocve.
Additional penalty of ten percent of the additional tax due <yr $20 whichever *s greater wV\ Oe assessed i f paynent is net
r e i v e d Oy the " p a r e n t due" date shown above. PLEASE M YOUR SOCIAL SECURiTY NUK3ER ON YGU3 CHECK. For pays>ent
infonwtion contact the Collection Division by calling (801) 297-7703.
AJDIUNG DIVISION
Becky McKenzfe CPA
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